Gainako Newspaper

..� Blood oozing profusely from Sheriff Minteh's Pelvis �
Mr. President, as my eyes gazed at the ruins of a community in France known as
Oradour-Sur-Glane, which was burnt by the blind forces of Nazi repression, my
heart could not but speak the language of torment and outrage while I wondered
how human beings with flesh and blood could pursue women and children to a
church and set it ablaze and reduce their bodies to ashes.

On the wall of the centre established for the remembrance of the atrocities one could read the
indictment of the Nazi forces. Indeed a system which could plague the minds of military personnel
with the logic of perpetrating senseless violence, bordering insanity, against unarmed and defenseless
women and children, can be said to have very little concern or respect for human life. Such a system
neither sought to inculcate in those government agents contempt for brutality or impunity nor armed
them with the capacity to reason and act in accordance with the spirit of brotherhood towards their
fellow human being.

Mr. President, as we pass the ghost houses of the Allioti and Binet families, the horrors committed
by a bygone generation, extracted from the diary of a legendary child named Anne Frank, which
were captured in black and white on the walls of the memorial centre, became starkly real. This
confirms that history never goes to sleep and is forever ready to bear witness to events which
humanity cannot erase from the minds of the living.

History did speak to us through the burnt walls of the church, on which the names of villagers who
died during the 1914 to 1918 war remained engraved. This must have been done in remembrance of
them. Little did these innocent villagers know that on 10 June 1944, 2000 Nazi forces would
descend on the village to plunder everything they had, set their village on fire and massacre it's 642
inhabitants including 193 children. "Even the children were not spared," lamented the writings on the
wall

Finally, the most outrageous part of our rapprochement with a sad page in French history was
reached when we came face to face with the statue of a wailing mother burning to death with her
baby in her arms. As we stared at this mother in anguish wailing forever in the wilderness of time
calling for redress of historical injustices and prevent future ones, my mind also strayed to that
bloody Wednesday of 10th May, when Sheriff Minteh lay in anguish expectedly asking what he had
done to be visited by raw death at the age of 20.

My wounded conscience was only consoled when I heard the unequivocal whisper from the voices
from the wall counselling: "Mais l'espoir nous fait vivre" (Hope will make us live) Indeed! Indeed!
When tragedy strikes, hope must be kept alive! Hope must be kept alive! I hope the Minteh Family
will keep hope alive.

Mr. President, the death of Sheriff Minteh and the subsequent turbulence which gripped Serrekunda
Central, on 10th May 2007, confirmed that events of disturbing ramifications are beginning to
unfold. This requires your immediate attention. This event came about a day after I attended a
symposium organized by the Council of Students of the University of Limoges in commemoration of
the national day set to focus on the atrocities of slavery. Little did I know that while I was
expounding on the subject of Africa's predicament in the 21st Century, I would receive news of
death and civil strife in The Gambia, on the 9 and 10 of May respectively, just after the symposium
where I made a passionate defence of the need for African governments to create the environment
for the total civil, political, economic, social and cultural emancipation of our peoples which had
been fettered by slavery and colonialism.

I made it abundantly clear that the objectives of studying African history is not merely to provide
evidence that people of African descent have made contributions to the intellectual treasury of
human kind and have built civilizations comparable to or more advanced than those that existed
elsewhere, nor is it designed to simply expose the oppression and exploitation which impoverished
the continent and her people during the slave trade and colonial period, On the contrary, the
understanding of the past should be linked to the appreciation of the task to reconstruct an Africa
that can guarantee liberty and prosperity to the people. I emphasized that African Governments
which subject their people to the same conditions of oppression and exploitation as had existed
under slavery and colonialism can never have the moral authority to call for redress of historical
injustices.

Mr. President the task of your Government is to ensure that the people in the Gambia enjoy
optimum liberty, dignity and prosperity. Hence, it is absolutely necessary for your government to
institute a Coroner's Inquest to establish the cause of death of Sheriff Minteh.

I have gathered from Foroyaa that the death certificate indicates that, Sheriff died of cardiac
respiratory arrest due to massive severe hemorrhage in the pelvis.. rectum of pelvic viscera due to
deep stab wound. Sheriff is reported to have claimed that he was stabbed twice;

On the other hand, the office of the Inspector General of Police informed the public that the incident
which happened at London Corner, Serrekunda between the hours of 19.00 hours to 20.00 hours
on Wednesday May 9 2007 was due to the fact that the Divisional Security Task Force was
responding to a tip off that some groups of youths at a particular Street in London Corner
Serekunda were smoking Canabis Sativa or Jamba.

The youths were also accused by the Office of the Inspector General of Police of robbery and
provoking passers by. According to the police, upon arrival at the scene, 12 people were arrested
with bundles of suspected cannabis; that other group members started running, that it is during their
pursuit that one of the suspects Sheriff Minteh, the deceased, fell on an iron sustaining injuries on his
groin, that Sheriff Minteh was rushed to Serrekunda Health Centre and later to Royal Victoria
Teaching Hospital were he was pronounced dead.

Mr. President, Sheriff has not only lost his life but is also accused of criminal activity when he can no
longer defend himself. This is precisely why it is necessary to hold a coroner's inquest to establish the
circumstances of his death.

It is also important to release all those arrested in connection with the protest against his death.
What is needed under such circumstances is for justice to be seen to be done and avoid inflaming
the situation by relying on repressive measures. You should come to terms with the fact that in the
absence of a strong parliamentary opposition to criticize excesses and put up measures to restrain
your government, you are duty bound to exercise self restraint

You should remember that the authority that you and your national assembly members now exercise
is derived from the people. It is therefore necessary to utilize progressive and community oriented
measures to promote positive values among the youth instead of stigmatizing and alienating them as
common criminals.

Even though I am no longer a National Assembly Member for the constituency, if your government
does not know how to implement it's community policing policies, my Centre for Social Science,
Research Civic Awareness and Community Initiatives would be willing to start community
programmes in London Corner to restore the sense of dignity and worth of the youth, under it's
community initiatives programmes. Community programmes instead of militarism is the avenue to
combat youth problems which are mainly by products of failed or non existing socioeconomic
policies.

Mr. President, history is now confronting you with the task you sought from the electorate: The
people have a right to liberty, dignity and prosperity. If you provide guarantees for the people to
enjoy such rights you can be said to have fulfilled your mandate. If you fail to guarantee such rights
you can be said to have betrayed your mandate. The choice is yours. History is waiting to pass it's
judgment. Posterity shall bear witness to the verdict.

Yours
Halifa Sallah

....Leadership Failure
........... � My Answers For Sheriff �
..........................................By Rtd Lt. Col. Samsudeen Sarr.....Posted May 16th, 2007

� The coup d�tat was outrageous and totally illegal; but the Gambians finally taking charge of their army was
absolutely agreeable. It was the only way we could have salvaged our honor and dignity.� -Rtd Lt Col Sam Sarr

Well Sheriff, allow me to first reciprocate your well appreciated protocol in your opening statement
expressing your admiration of my presentations by in turn saying that the feeling is mutual. I think you
write well and with genuine frankness. I will however try to be very brief this time.

Anyhow in response to your questionnaires, I want to before going into any details point out certain
flaws in your conclusions made out of what I believe was insufficient knowledge of the critical facts
involved. In fact I think your conclusions were drawn more out of speculative ideas than anything
lucidly stated in that rejoinder on Mr. Yero Jallow's exposition. For instance, I don�t think I
mentioned any element of regret for standing by Sabally then when Colonel Jim Shaw tried to
prosecute him at Yundum Barracks. In fact the details of what caused the BATT commander to go
after Sabally were not at all shared in my writing; and without those details sheriff, I am afraid any
conclusion drawn on the embryonic facts given would be a hasty one.

You see, Colonel Shaw despite his vast experience and high rank as a British officer, I believed then
and still believe that he was wrong in going after Sabally in the way he did. I will however share the
details of the first incident with you and let you make your own judgment after weighing the odds
later.

Just after taking over from Colonel Gilbert who had completed an admirable two-year training
mandate in the Gambia in 1990, Col. Shaw started his tenure with some bumpy obstacles. The
dynamics in the Gambia National Army (GNA) had just started to show signs of turbulence in the
wake of the departed Senegalese with some officers so dissatisfied with the insurmountable
command problems that few including me decided to resign our commission..

Yes Sheriff my faith in the future of the army was seriously eroded by my inability to impact any
change over what I knew was an inevitable train wreck ahead. Lt. Momodou Camara, now living in
New York, a sharp and very brilliant officer was successful in getting his wish to go. In my case
however, when I tried to leave, the commander refused to accept my resignation regardless of the
fact that it was my constitutional right to resign as a commissioned officer. When I challenged the
legality of the commander�s decision, he put me through a kangaroo court martial and had me
convicted and demoted. To give you the entire facts behind that story would certainly alter the
brevity I want to maintain this time. The only thing I would add to what I already said is that Col.
Shaw the ultimate adviser to the commander did nothing to correct the obvious mistakes.

Anyway in the case of Sabally, he was deployed to Kudang Camp as the platoon commander. One
day he organized with his men a hunting expedition that unfortunately ended in a disaster. They
walked into a herd of bush hugs and fired at it dropping one with a clean shot. But just when they
were about to reach the fallen hug�s location, the animal suddenly got up and tried to run away. One
of the soldiers out of panic fired another shot that missed the target and killed the platoon sergeant.
By the GNA rules and regulations, the soldiers were not under any circumstances supposed to use
the bullets stored purposely for combat on animal hunting trips. Col Shaw viewed the accident as
another setback to his efforts to run a problem-free army already saturated with troubles.
Sabally, he therefore felt, had to be charged for an unauthorized hunting trip, illegal use of military
arms and ammunitions and some other charges that would have probably cost him his job and sent
him to jail for a long time.

The commander stood by Col. Shaw and the case file was compiled for immediate trial. Anyhow,
just when the commander was about to finish the preparatory phase for the court, I came to learn
that the authority for soldiers at Kudang Camp going on hunting trips using military assault and live
rounds was long ago approved by the GNA commander when his brother-in-law was in command
of that unit. The officer had complained of boredom at the isolated camp and was given the green
light to hunt whenever he wanted.

To be fair to Sabally therefore, I thought punishing him for the act when his predecessors got away
with it was unfair and should not have been a court martial offense, unless the commander explained
why one set of rules could be applied on this case and another to the previous ones. In the end
however, I was able to mobilize the conscientious officers and successfully stood against the court
conspiracy. Sheriff, nothing I did in that case and at that time was regrettable today. Colonel Shaw
was just wrong in every meaning of the word, period. He simply wanted to make Sabally the
sacrificial lamb to tidy up his resume�.

With that much so far, I believe conclusions drawn on what I previously attempted to explain would
be fairer and more realistic now. The second case at Yundum Barrack is more complex but
anchored on similar principles in that Col. Shaw and the commander unjustifiably tried to go after
Sabally�s jugular vein on a trouble that was not entirely his fault.

Let me now look at your argument over the case of the Nigerians. The reason I brought up their
presence in the GNA was the never ending blame people have been directing to us, the Gambian
senior officers for our failure to defend the system from the mutinous junior officers. So all I wanted
to put across was our weak or ineffective positions under the colossal command power of the
Nigerians. However in addition to dismantling the Senegalese and British command and control
strategies, the Nigerians were geniuses in confusing all of us under their command. Between 1992
to1994, they had succeeded in instilling in most of the junior officers that they were more competent
than their seniors without demonstrating any evidence to back that theory. Perhaps compounded by
every soldier�s traditional fixation with jujus and their ability to elevate them above the ordinary,
seniority and respect for chain of command had momentarily ceased to exist. It was open secret that
few days before the coup almost all participants went for counseling and help from different juju or
spiritual advisers. That�s another serious area I may in the future discuss. But the juju phenomenon
was as a critical factor as any major problem was in establishing command discipline.

But actually Sheriff I tried everything to challenge the status quo; and when I could not gain any
headway I tendered my resignation to General Dada the Nigerian commander at the time and opted
to transfer to the police force. They wouldn�t let me go but offered to transfer me to the ministry of
defense away from the barracks life. I was there up to the day of the coup. And while at the defense
ministry I had tried all I could with minimal success to help correct the errors within my reach. I
wouldn�t enumerate the actions I had taken then, but the evidences are there and I believe history
would someday prove me right.

But I want you to remember this as my last statement today, the Gambia National Army
evolutionary process started from a wrong footing with most of its members, officers and other
ranks, joining it with little or no stake in the system they were meant to protect. Children of
prominent Gambians were not among us; as a result, the commitment of the average soldier became
more of how to secure one�s means of livelihood than to fight and defend the system as expected of
us. I even honestly believe that most GNA soldiers wanted to see the end of the PPP regime at the
time of the coup. By then, we were all fed up with one foreign force after another coming to reduce
us into nothingness in the name of giving us a never-ending training rigmarole. The coup d�tat was
outrageous and totally illegal; but the Gambians finally taking charge of their army was absolutely
agreeable. It was the only way we could have salvaged our honor and dignity.

Lt Col. Sheriff Samsudeen M. Sarr (rtd)

...Leadership Failure
.....Questions to Lt. Col. Sheriff Samsudeen Sarr (Rtd)
...................................By Sheriff.................................Posted May 15th, 2007

" Those who do not learn from the mistakes of history are doomed to repeat it. " -- George Santayana

Let me start with a disclaimer: Commander Sarr, I cannot but marvel at your prose. I admire the
crispness of your insights and the concise language with which you articulate your thoughts. I tip my
hat to you for your immense literary prowess. My fondness for your work, notwithstanding, I'm
compelled to point to what I consider errors of judgment on your part during an otherwise illustrious
military career that has witnessed your ascent to the very zenith of the echelon as Commander,
Gambia National Army (GNA).

I should, perhaps, say that in reaching my conclusion as to those two lapses of judgment, I relied
entirely on what has surfaced in your own writings. My observations therefore, should not be
misconstrued as an attack on your integrity or military service but rather, as an attempt at inquiry.

In other words, my queries are meant to highlight leadership lessons learned, if you will, with a view
to averting future mistakes. So feel free, as I'm sure you will, to set the records straight and augment
my (and hopefully every reader's) understanding of what transpired while you were at the helm. Our
dear country (and continent) has notoriously suffered more than it's fair share not only of atrocious
leadership, but also a lack of accountability for leadership shortcomings. Hence, I savor the
opportunity to seek answers of those such as yourself, who have held preeminent positions at the
helm of our nation's affairs.

One of the matters for which I petition you directly involved that infamous nemesis of yours, Sana
Sabally -- another of our former leaders, albeit de facto, of whom important answers are being
earnestly sought. Here are the two incidents in question, as they surfaced in your writings: First, in
your rejoinder to Yero Jallow's call for a South African--style "truth and reconciliation" deal for
ex-VP Sabally, you recounted how Sabally was within a hairsbreadth of being drummed out of the
military, even court-martial, at the urging of his British trainer. As your recounted in your piece, you
interceded crucially to salvage Sabally's career at the time because of the junior officer's outward
piety and decorum.

The fact that you felt deceived by Sabally's masked behavior indicated to me that you regret having
pleaded on his behalf. We all have done things that we wish we hadn't. However, questions about
your judgment arise in my mind in that you'd disregarded or discount the recommendations of a
training officer; one who had been out in the trenches with the trainees; someone who, by dint of the
time spent in drills at "boot camp" with the recruits, certainly knows their characters and
personalities better.

As a seasoned officer, i'm sure you are cognizant of the fact that the toughness of training drills
coupled with the blood and tears of the bushes and battlefield allow for no faking. Training camp
represents make-or-brake moments for any soldier. It sounds to me like Sabally didn't make the
cut, according to the British trainer. By default, real character, or lack thereof, emerges when times
are trying, such as at basic training. While Sabally may have successfully faked it in his capacity as
an administrative assistant at the Yundum barracks, his true color surfaced and was evident to the
British trainer in Kudang, leading the officer to reach the conclusions he did. Why were the officer's
recommendations dismissed so lightly as personal grudge?

One could argue that by keeping Sabally in the army based purely on personal sentiments you felt
toward him, and against the advised, professional opinion of the expert British military trainer, you --
more than anyone else -- helped create the monster that later "terrorized", as you put it, and hold to
ransom the people of our nation. Granted, it might have been inadvertent on your part, and
unforeseeable at the time. However, the consequences of his ascent to power, which was largely
owed to you, would later spell tragedy to so many Gambians -- sad to say, yourself included.

The lesson in this story, as I see it, boils down to this: failure to apply the rules without passion or
prejudice can have deadly consequences -- greater consequences than can even be imagined.
Today the victims of Sabally's well-documented brutality can look back to that juncture in his career
and wonder what could have, should have, or might have, been done to forestall their
Sabally-wrought predicament.

That would serve as little solace to them. It is the mark of courageous and strong leader to let tough
but right decisions stand without favor or fear -- painful and unpalatable as they may be. In allowing
Sana to remain in the force despite his obvious sub-par performance, such leadership was wanting
-- regrettably so and with deadly outcomes. Right decisions, even if they be unpopular, are more
enduring and generally serve the best interest of the greater good; whereas popular, ill-advised
decisions not only are transient, but usually boomerang to haunt and hurt us.

The second of my issues with Commander Sarr surfaced in yet another response article that was
recently published at the Echo. You described your relationship as officers in the GNA under your
PPP-appointed Nigerian superiors as thus: "they appointed us for the duties we performed even
if we were apprehensive about their decisions ; they paid us our salaries and allowances; they
promoted and demoted us; they decided where we should be trained locally and
internationally; they prepared the national security doctrine, the annual training program
and supervise all our activities in the way it suited their objectives; in a nut shell, the lifelines
of our careers were directly wired to their seats" (emphasis mine).

This revelation vis-a-vis your role under the Nigerian overseers, left me wondering: Why, if you've
had so little input/influence, did your conscionably remain in the army? Would it have been more
honorable to resign on principle in an organization where you were treated in such a manner? Did
you just unquestioningly follow orders from the Nigerians? Even when you were "apprehensive"
about those decisions/orders? Was it fear of jeopardizing "careers [which] were directly wired to
their seats"? If so, didn't you feel you owe a higher allegiance to the Gambia, and not those imported
mercenaries? What did you do to change the status quo? In other words, since you decided to
remain in the army, what did you do to effect change from within? You say you were just "captains"
under those "seasoned heavyweights" from Nigeria. How come more junior officers (i.e.
lieutenants) rose above you to change the status quo -- for better or for worse?

I raise these questions, Commander Sarr -- my dear namesake -- not to slight your service or
question your integrity. Far from it! These are honest questions that arose in my mind as i read you
articles. I hope the answers you provide will provide a lesson in leadership to many of the up and
coming generation of young Gambians. I await you response with edge-of-the seat anticipation.

Sheriff
North Carolina, USA

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